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The Implied Benchmark Rate in the Credit Default Swap
Market of Sovereign Bonds
Abstract
Credit default swap(CDS) is a new developed derivative to insure the credit risk of an
underlying entity. This paper investigates the correlation relationship of the CDS market of
sovereign borrowers and sovereign bond market. Applying the formula in the paper of Hull et
al.(2004), an implied default-free rate(also called benchmark rate) of CDS market is computed;
its correlations with US treasury and LIBOR are tested respectively. The tests indicate that,
in sovereign CDS market, the benchmark is more related with US treasury, although LIBOR
has been used as the best approximation of market benchmark in both academia and industry.
Therefore, this paper suggest the importance of US treasury to sovereign CDS market in
measuring market’s reference and searching for mispriced chance.
In addition, a spuriously controversy result are found as rating-specific CDS benchmark
rates are contrasted. A monotonic decrease of these benchmarks is clearly observed for the
sovereigns with lower credit rating and higher default risk. The phenomenon is carefully
explained and the main reason comes from the higher CDS rate than yield spread. This
invites a further comparison of the price discovery processes in sovereign CDS market and the
corresponding sovereign bond market.
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1 Introduction
The purpose of developing credit default swap(CDS) is to extract credit risk from other risks,
and trade on it more efficiently. The idea of CDS contract comes from life insurance. You pay
predeterminate fixed annual fee to buy an insurance– a CDS contract, use it to redeem the
loss of your lending money upon the default of the borrower. The annual fee is named CDS
rate, representing the market expected default risk premium. Besides, yield spread calculated
by bond yield over default-free rate, is another measure of default risk in bond market. As
CDS market being more developed, the convergence of these two default risk measures and the
efficiency of CDS market are widely questioned and examined by people from academia and
industry.
This paper is a continuation of the topic with a concentration of CDS of sovereign bonds
in emerging market. The arrangement of this paper is the following: section two is a review of
previous research on the relation of CDS market and bond market; section three talks about
the methodology; section four gives data description and analysis; section five shows regression
results and findings; the last section is the conclusion.
2 Previous research on credit risk
Credit risk has been extensively discussed since late 1900. Previous research focus on the
dynamic pricing mechanism of Credit risk premium. There are two types of models extensively
used: structural models by Black and Scholes(1973) and Merton(1974); reduced form models by
Litterman and Iben(1991), Jarrow and Turnbull(1995). Various macro or market-level factors
are used in these models, and their explanation powers to the variation of credit risk have been
widely proved. Meanwhile, debates of these models are raised due to the low goodness of fit–
the large proportion of unexplained variation in credit risk. Elton et al.(2001) find taxation
and systematic risk premia only account for two-thirds of the yield spread, and Collin-Dufresne
et al.(2001) show that factors suggested by traditional credit models explain only one-forth of
the variation in yield spread.1 More research and new approaches, therefore, are needed to
solve the puzzle. Moreover, the limited number of research on CDS can no longer satisfy the
exploded need of credit derivative market.
literatures on the relationship of CDS and bond markets which is mostly interested by
1A detailed review on these debates is in Blanco(2004).
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market practitioners, are much fewer. A group of research come out recently become building
blocks in this field. Hull et al.(2004) study the arbitrage relationship of CDS rate and yield
spread. Blanco et al.(2004) analysis dynamic relationship between investment-grade bonds
and credit default swaps, conclude that CDS is the upper bound and yield spread is the lower
bound of credit risk premium. Chan-Lau and Kim (2004) find no equilibrium price relationship
between sovereign CDS and sovereign bond markets although prices converge in long term.
Due to the limitation of CDS data, these studies work on general CDS data with a mix
of corporation borrowers and sovereign borrowers. Researchers and market participants both
prefer LIBOR to US treasury as being the measure of implied benchmark risk-free rate in CDS
market, saying that LIBOR is less volatile and more reasonable. However, in this study of the
sovereign CDS before May 2002, I find US treasury is the better measure and treasury curve
should be readopted by participants in sovereign CDS market. Both the econometric tests and
the study of market behavior give a strong support to this conclusion.
3 Methodology
In this paper, both econometrics and analytical study are used on the features of sovereign CDS
market. Hull et. al(2004)’s regression models are to compare the closeness of US treasury or
LIBOR to CDS benchmark. Rating shocks are imposed lately to the regressions to reexamine
their relationship. Analytical study on market behavior is followed to search the reasons
behind.
3.1 A contemporary arbitrage relationship
CDS contract is usually bought by investors in the corresponding bond market, to earn an
insured risk free return by transferring their default risk to CDS seller. This risk free return is
the difference of bond yield over CDS rate.
Calculation Formula: r = y − s
Where, y is n-year par yield, s is n-year CDS rate, and r is the n-year risk free return named the
implied benchmark rate in CDS market. If CDS and bond markets are well co-integrated,and
CDS rate is correctly priced, this implied benchmark in CDS market should equal the bench-
mark rate in bond market. Since US treasury or LIBOR is commonly used benchmark,
Arbitrage relationship: r = rT ; r = rS .
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Where,rT is US treasury yield, rS is LIBOR rate. It is same as to say the equilibrium of CDS
rate with yield spread. Where there is an equilibrium, there is no arbitrage, the relationship
of CDS and bond markets will be stable.
3.2 Regression models in Hull et al.(2004)
In practice, the equilibrium is affected by the following reasons:
1. The cheap-to-deliver bond option in CDS contract;
2. The counterpart default risk in CDS market;
3. The Repo cost in bond yield;
4. Liquidity difference of CDS and bond markets;
5. Regulation (like taxation) difference in two markets.
Besides, as discussed by Hull et al.(2004), CDS gives the holder the right to sell the par
bond for its face value plus accrued interest so CDS rate should be adjusted by this accrued
interest due before default.2 y4 is used to measure the accrued interest. The calculation of
implied benchmark therefore is also adjusted.3
Adjusted Formula:
r = y − s(1 + y
4
) (1)
The equilibrium relationships are tested by two similar regressions.
Regression Models:
r = a+ b1rT + ² (2)
r = a+ b2rS + ². (3)
When applying Hull et al.’s models (equation (2) and (3)), I firstly examine the arbitrage
relationship by the join hypothesis H0 : a = 0 and b = 1; then, two separate hypotheses
H0 : a = 0 and H0 : b = 1. In order to be compared with Hull et al’s, student t tests are
mostly used, after the join hypothesis is rejected.4
2See Hull et al.(2004) for detailed description.
3These linear regressions are valid since the explanatory variable rT or rS is not systematic correlated with
²: the disturbances in CDS market.
4F test on the join hypothesis is different from t tests on each part of the join hypothesis. T tests are
necessary when the join hypothesis rejected. Since both Hull et al.’s research and my result reject the strict
5
3.3 The impact of rating events on the relationship
Rating events are updated public information about the change of credit risk, which will affect
both bond and CDS markets. Previous research on the relationship of CDS and rating finds
that negative outlook of a borrower will push up its CDS rate; formal rating change, on the
contrast, will not bring big shocks to CDS market. Research on the relationship of bond and
rating have similar findings.
When the equilibrium is loosely held, or the correlation between the benchmark rates is
statistically stable, new coming information will have same impact on CDS and bond yield,
therefore not affect their equilibrium. To test the stability of the regressive relationship, I
added a measure of rating events– q into equation (2) and (3).
Rating events include rating changes and outlook changes. Value of q at time t is generated
by
qt =
mt
nt
.
Where, mt is the total number of rating events until time t, nt is the total number of the total
observations until time t. q is not the cumulative frequency or probability of rating events,
since nt is changing over time. 5 Thus, two extended regression models are also estimated:
r = a+ b1rT + cq + ² (4)
r = a+ b2rS + cq + ². (5)
4 Data analysis
In this paper, I use daily data of sovereign Euro-bond yield spreads, CDS rates, and US treasury
yields from 04/01/1999 until 5/22/2002, provides by an anonymous broker. Among them, I
choose 5 year as the constant time to maturity, since 5-yr CDS is the most liquid. 5-year daily
LIBOR rates are from the online database of Federal Reserve. Information on rating events
are extracted from S&P’s Rating History. There are totally 46 Euro-bonds under 20 sovereign
entities, mostly in emerging markets.
To get 5-year bond yields of each sovereign entity, I use linear interpolation of reference
yields under the same sovereign name and get 2401 yield spreads under 8 sovereigns. 12
arbitrage relationship, t tests are applied
5The cumulative probability is calculated by the total number of observations which is constant over N .
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sovereigns are dropped due to the lack of reference bonds, or unmatched time to maturity. 6
According to S&P’s rating history (see Table 15), during 04/01/1999 to 05/22/2002, there
are 48 rating events of the 8 sovereigns, including rating changes and outlook changes. Their
ratings at 05/22/2002 are:
Investment Grades Speculation Grades
Sovereign Korea South Africa Mexico Egypt Russia Brazil Venezuela Argentina
Rating A- BBB BBB- BB+ BB BB- B D
The euro-bonds are in US dollars with fixed semi-annual coupons. They are assumed having
identical properties, so that their yield spreads only embed sovereign-level default premiums,
no bond-specific default premiums needed to be considered.
5 Regression results
5.1 Overall arbitrage relationship
Hull et al.(2004)’s t tests show a = 0 is accepted but b = 1 is rejected, the arbitrage relationship
is not strictly held. However, the values of r and rS are found very close, in practice, r–the
benchmark in CDS market can always be measured by inflating rS–LIBOR rate with 10bps.7
Except defaulted Argentina, 7 sovereigns from rating A to B are pooled together and
regressed. Both F and t tests reject the null hypotheses of having a arbitrage relationship on
95% confidence level. a = 0 can be accepted at 1% significant coefficient, but rejected at 5%
significant coefficient; b = 1 is rejected with no doubt. rT explains 31.95% of total variation in
r at equation (2); rS explains 28.57% of total variation in r at equation (3). To confirm the
significance of the difference in these two regressions, I use F1935,1935 distribution. It turns out
that US treasury is a better regressor than LIBOR to the implied benchmark.
6The interpolation requires at least one bond with a time to maturity(T ) less than 5 yrs, and one bond with
a T longer than 5 yrs and shorter than 10 yrs.The selected sovereigns usually have 2 or 3 reference bonds, the
linear spine interpolation approach is adopted.
710bps gets from their estimate of r − rS for Aaa and Aa borrowers. The estimates for other rating classes
are not used for the measure to get rid of the counterpart default risk in a CDS. See Hull et al.(2004) for details.
7
Table 1: Pool Regressions on US Treasury Yield(rT )
Hull’s
Case
Sovereign Case
Pool Investment Grade Speculation Grade
a 0.12 -1.05359 0.33422 -2.79665
SE of a 0.07 0.18143 0.12573 0.21509
b1 1.1 1.19831 1.01946 1.49835
SE of b1 0.014 0.03973 0.02839 0.04628
SE of Residual 0.25 0.85261 0.27374 0.86382
Adjusted R2 0.941 0.3195 0.6402 0.4637
No. 370 1937 725 1212
Table 2: Pool Regressions on LIBOR Rate(rS)
Hull’s
Case
Sovereign Case
Pool Investment Grade Speculation Grade
a 0.09 -0.37150 0.79152 -1.87362
SE of a 0.059 0.17207 0.13129 0.20628
b2 0.972 0.90367 0.79075 1.11860
SE of b2 0.01 0.03245 0.02559 0.03819
SE of Residual 0.203 0.87352 0.30086 0.90268
Adjusted R2 0.961 0.2857 0.5686 0.4144
No. 370 1937 725 1212
5.2 Loose arbitrage relationship appeared at Investment Grade Rating
Since the ratings of the sample sovereigns vary widely, structural changes or inconsistency
of parameters across rating grades are suspected. The data, therefore, are divided into two
rating groups: 3 sovereigns in investment grade group and 4 sovereigns in speculation grade
group. Regression results on each group are summarized in Table 1 and Table 2. Hull et al.’s
results are listed in the same tables for comparison. The chow test shows significant structural
difference over groups. The formula is
F =
(RSS1 −RSS2 −RSSUR)/K
(RSS1 +RSS2)/(N − 2K) .
The computed F values are
rT : Fchow = 453.50; rS : Fchow = 390.77.
The goodness of fit and the standard errors are greatly improved in group regressions. It also
shows a hint on the pricing gap between investment and speculation rating grades.
Among these results, the regression on US treasury yield in investment grade group is most
significant. It has better fit, where a = 0 is accepted at 0.5% significant level, and b = 1
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Table 3: Regressions for Speculation Group
US treasury yield rT LIBOR rate rS
—— Rating changes Outlook changes —— Rating changes Outlook changes
a -2.79665 -2.18104 -2.08156 -1.87362 -1.32624 -1.16526
SE of a 0.21509 0.15145 0.22554 0.20628 0.15160 0.21857
b 1.49835 1.35707 1.38401 1.11860 1.01949 1.02210
SE of b 0.04628 0.03119 0.04698 0.03819 0.02693 0.03900
q —— 30.17247 -73.97128 —— 21.60688 -75.53949
SE of q —— 3.34295 8.74955 —— 3.62235 9.19735
SE of Residual 0.86382 0.52784 0.83971 0.90268 0.57701 0.87887
Adjusted R2 0.4637 0.6706 0.4932 0.4144 0.6064 0.4449
is accepted at higher significant level. The arbitrage relationship exists. The relationships
are not held for the regression on LIBOR in investment grade group and all regressions in
speculation group. Compared with Hull et al.’s results, the estimate of intercept a is much
greater in absolute value and the goodness of fit is lower. These may imply the existence of
other latent fixed and/or random effect. Group regressions also show strongly proof that US
treasury yield explains implied benchmark better than LIBOR.
5.3 Rating events affect the relationship at Speculation Grade Rating
Rating events time series q is introduced to the original equation, the extended regression mod-
els (4)and (5) are regressed. The impacts of rating change and outlook change are estimated
separately to compare their different impacts on CDS.
There are 6 rating changes and 8 outlook changes in the pool regressions. Besides, Argentina
has 7 rating changes and 4 outlook changes before its default. Although the estimates of the
partial coefficient of q for each group are both significant, the regressions in speculation grade
group are much improved, the impact of rating change is more significant than outlook change
; the regressions in investment grade group have no big change. Due to the limitation of rating
events, I have not differentiated the changing directions of these events. The estimations for
speculation grade group are summarized at Table 3. The regression on Argentina is presented
at Table 12 in appendix.
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Table 4: Mean of benchmarks
Benchmarks The Mean Procedure
Pool Investment Grade Speculation Grade
r 4.3876 4.8342 4.12042
rT 4.5407 4.4141 4.61646
rS 5.2664 5.1125 5.35850
6 An analytical study
6.1 Why implied benchmark much closer to US treasury?
Hull et al.’s estimations find LIBOR and US treasury are efficient upper and lower boundaries
of the implied benchmark and the value of r more closes to LIBOR. To sovereign CDS in
emerging market, these boundaries, however, are only meaningful at investment grade. For
the borrowers at speculation grade, the implied benchmark drops below US treasury yield. US
treasury is more efficient than LIBOR to be the upper bound. These differences are illustrated
at following inequalities and Table 4.
Hull et al.(2004)’s Case:
rT ≤ r ≤ rS ; r − rT
rS − rT = 0.904 (6)
Sovereign Case:
Investment Grade
rT ≤ r ≤ rS ; r − rT
rS − rT = 0.60154; (7)
Speculation Grade
r ≤ rT ≤ rS ; r − rT
rS − rT = −0.66847. (8)
To look for the reasons behind these difference, I outline the rating-specific implied bench-
mark at Table 5. Hull et al.(2004) observe the implied rate rises when rating is declining.
They explain this phenomenon only partially by the counterpart default risk in a CDS, and
accept the existence of other factors. While, in sovereign case, I find the opposite result– the
implied rate is declining with rating. The explanation with the counterpart default risk in
Hull et al.(2004) therefore can not apply. This also shows traditional factors in reasoning the
behavior of CDS market are very limited.
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Table 5: Comparison Table
Rating
r-rT r-rS
No.
Mean S.E. Mean S.E.
Sovereign Bond Case
Korea A- 0.621364 0.0125609 -0.08167 0.0104588 247
South Africa BBB 0.458158 0.02095 -0.1797 0.02013 144
Mexico BBB- 0.254863 0.0122359 -0.46618 0.0174240 334
Investment Grade ———- 0.42011 0.0102 -0.27828 0.01167 725
Egypt BB+ 0.16208 0.05497 -0.4623 0.04844 104
Russia BB -0.05197 0.0204105 -0.8058 0.0222210 374
Brazil BB- -0.70571 0.0221534 -1.49305 0.0200528 452
Venezuela B -0.99163 0.0863562 -0.68884 0.0869170 282
Argentina D -11.7831 0.9739806 -12.5745 0.9709332 464
Speculation Grade ———- -0.49604 0.02596 -1.23809 0.02602 1212
Pool ———- -0.15313 0.01949 -0.87884 0.01989 1937
John Hull’s case
AAA/Aa 0.5130 0.0197 -0.0955 0.0131
A 0.6433 0.0182 -0.0583 0.0159
BBB 0.8493 0.0363 -0.0221 0.0279
Pool 0.6287 0.0138 -0.0651 0.0106
6.2 Why implied benchmark is less than US treasury?
According to the calculation formula of the implied benchmark, its relevant position to US
treasury is actually driven by the relationship of yield spread and CDS rate.8. When bond
yield exceed CDS, meaning that buying default risk insurance in CDS market is cheaper,
the implied benchmark will be greater than US treasury; when bond yield is less than CDS,
meaning that hedging default risk at bond market is cheaper, the implied benchmark will
be less than US treasury. When a borrower’s credit quality declines, both yield spread and
CDS rate will rise. If they both act by the same pace and magnitude, that will not affect the
relationship of implied benchmark with US treasury. But, when they do not act at the same
style, the relationship will be influenced; this is exact the fact I have observed from the date:
CDS rate rises faster when credit quality of borrowers decaying. The study of the relationship
of implied benchmark and treasury yield, then returns back to the relationship of yield spread
and CDS rate, which is the most fundamental relationship of these two markets.
8Yield spread is defined by the yield of defaultable bond over US treasury yield, represents the default risk
premium in bond market
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6.3 Why CDS is higher than yield spread?
6.3.1 Graphic relation
The comparison of yield spread and CDS rate is illustrated by Figure 1-4. Graphs in Figure
1 are about sovereigns at investment grade: Korea, South Africa and Mexico. CDS rate is
consistently lower than yield spread, and a price gap is clearly observed. But the price gap
seems converging and diminishing at later’s trading dates, especially in Mexico. Only one
upgrade rating event is in Mexico on Feb. 2002 during sample period, but the gap started
converging 10 months earlier and diminished 4 months earlier than the rating even. So, rating
change is not the reason to the price convergence in Mexico.
Figure 2-4 list sovereigns at speculation grade. Egypt’s CDS is very illiquid, the price gap
does not shrink. The value of CDS exceeds yield spread since March 2002, two months before
its rating downgrade, which may imply a market preadjustment. In Russia and Venezuela,
CDS is below yield spread at starting date, and beyond it from the middle of year 2001.
Compared with investment grade, price differences in speculation grade are much smaller, and
CDS curves are more smooth, showing improvement of liquidity. In Brazil, CDS is very liquid
and consistently higher than yield spread. But the price difference converges from time to
time, showing more integration of two markets. Argentina has exceptional data since 2002,
CDS firstly jumps to 14000bps, then drops to 10000bps level. The jumps in CDS is ahead of
yield spread during this pre-default period, behaving as a leading indicator.
6.3.2 Regressive relation
Using sovereign-specific linear regressions, the overall correlation of CDS and yield spread is
outlined at Table 13 and 14. These regressions are better fit and more significant than previous
ones. Results on Egypt and South Africa are insignificant due to illiquid CDS.
The estimates of intercept are insignificantly different from zero, and coefficient estimates
of CDS rate vary from 0.8 to 1.4, except Egypt and South Africa. Where, the estimates at
investment grade are greater than 1, showing the yield spread is statistically higher than CDS
rate; estimates at speculation grade are less than 1.
6.3.3 An explanation by market demand and supply
Blanco et al.(2004) discuss that CDS is the upper bound and yield spread is the lower bound
of credit risk premium, implying CDS should be analytical higher than yield spread. Where,
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Hull et al.(2004)’s study suggests an opposite measure.
Possible reasons driving each of these situations are: the difference in liquidity across
market, and/or the difference in market demands. Based on my data, liquidity reason is
excluded, although it can explain the convergence of the prices. Lower liquidity in CDS
combines with both higher and lower CDS rate in the case of Egypt. Instead, the consistent
high CDS at speculation grade suggests a more important reason: the increase of market
demand in CDS market to insure default drives up the price and make CDS more expensive
to buy. This also show the preference of market participants on CDS market when they really
want to hedge their risk exposures on the bonds at speculation grade. The increasing demand
for, therefore, pulls up the CDS price.
7 Conclusion
According to the discussions in previous sections, I conclude the following points:
1. US treasury is a better approximation of the implied default-free rate in sovereign CDS
market than LIBOR;
2. CDS rate at speculation grade are generally beyond yield spread;
3. Increasing market demand for CDS on sovereigns at lower rating drives CDS up;
4. Liquidity results in price convergence;
5. Rating events causes diverging behavior on CDS and bond markets at speculation grade.
Some of these findings may raise up new interests and open new research areas in the
future, since more dynamic study is needed to firm a more solid support to these points.
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Table 6: Data Interpolation Record–(07/22/2004)
country bond1 maturity1 bond2 maturity2 bond3 maturity3
Argentina Arge− FRB 3/29/2005 Arge− 09 4/7/2009 — —
Brazil Brazil − 04 4/15/2004 Brazil− 07 7/26/2007 Brazil− 09 10/15/2009
China China− 04 China− 08 12/15/2008 China− 11 5/23/2011
Egypt Egypt− 06 7/11/2006 Egypt− 11 7/11/2011 — —
Israel IsraelE − 06 6/16/2006 Israel− 10 3/15/2010 — —
Korea KDB06 5/15/2006 Kor − 08 4/15/2008 — —
Mexico Mex− 05 4/6/2005 Mex− 07 1/15/2007 Mex− 11 1/14/2011
Russia RUS − 03 6/10/2003 RUS − 07 6/26/2007 RUS − 10 3/31/2010
South Africa SOAF − 06 10/17/2006 SOAF − 09 5/19/2009 — —
Venezuela V ene− 07 6/18/2007 V ene−NMB − 05 12/18/2005 — —
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Table 7: Regressions on various benchmarks (Korea)
Constant -0.0421 0.11932 -0.6695 -0.5189
(0.324)
SE of Constant 0.14548 0.1208 0.13239 0.13268
Coef of rT 1.15126 1.13866 ———– ———–
SE of coef. 0.03305 0.02726 ———– ———–
Coef of rS ———– ———– 1.11552 1.09416
SE of coef. ———– ———– 0.02594 0.02556
Coef of q ———– -36.41 ———– -14.383
SE of coef ———– 3.36867 ———– 3.35789
SE of Residual 0.18986 0.15645 0.15842 0.15309
Adjusted R2 0.8313 0.8854 0.8825 0.8903
Table 8: Regressions on different benchmarks (Mexico)
Constant -0.9802 -0.9415 0.51655 0.58428
SE of Constant 0.1359 0.12073 0.17595 0.17806
Coef1 of rT 1.27576 1.27781 ———- ———-
SE of coef1 0.03024 0.02685 ———- ———
Coef2 of rS ——— ——— 0.81101 0.80146
SE of coef2 ———- ——— 0.03369 0.03383
Coef3 of q ——— -66.99 ——— -25.312
SE of coef3 ——— 7.05664 ——— 12.1458
SE of Residual 0.20028 0.17783 0.30479 0.30327
Adjusted R2 0.8423 0.8757 0.6347 0.6384
Table 9: Regressions on various benchmarks (Brazil)
Constant -3.43403 -3.57299 -2.842635 -1.91951
SE of Constant 0.100982 0.20316 0.1259903 0.230524
Coef of rT 1.568426 1.591228 ———– ———–
SE of coef. 0.020847 0.035657 ———– ———–
Coef of rS ———– ———– 1.241553 1.114136
SE of coef. ———– ———– 0.0223218 0.034632
Coef of q ———– 6.935808 ———– -49.6303
SE of coef ———– 8.797618 ———– 10.47901
SE of Residual 0.28953 0.28965 0.38019 0.37145
Adjusted R2 0.9262 0.9261 0.8727 0.8785
17
Table 10: Regressions on rT (Russia)
total change rating change outlook change
Constant -1.57786 -1.81975 -1.791772 -1.06155
SE of Cons 0.181087 0.202933 0.1829831 0.206911
Coef of rT 1.332425 1.361092 1.344793 1.236896
SE of coef 0.03924 0.040517 0.0383731 0.043127
Coef of q ———- 9.296025 15.72242 -41.5878
SE of coef ———- 3.620474 3.513826 8.755815
SE of Residual 0.36188 0.35919 0.35297 0.35183
Adjusted R2 0.7554 0.759 0.7673 0.7688
Table 11: Regressions on various benchmarks (Venezuela)
Constant -6.76807 -7.06632 -3.808003 -3.70939
SE of Constant 0.996918 0.985814 0.8929995 0.895296
Coef of rT 2.305372 2.404267 ———– ———–
SE of coef. 0.224527 0.223211 ———– ———–
Coef of rS ———– ———– 1.413709 1.406151
SE of coef ———– ———– 0.1735201 0.173422
Coef of q ———– -88.3867 ———– -37.9842
SE of coef ———– 27.96347 ———– 29.65481
SE of Residual 1.3723 1.3508 1.4476 1.4459
Adjusted R2 0.2709 0.2936 0.1887 0.1906
Table 12: Regressions on rT (Argentina)
Not added Total change Rating change Outlook change
Constant -70.977 -21.1301 64.25671 -116.47
(0.159)
SE of Cons 6.443582 14.97999 13.04487 8.510645
Coef of rT 13.25201 5.417936 -8.747957 19.58147
(0.031)
SE of coef1 1.320765 2.498528 2.237399 1.49632
Coef of q ———– -657.512 -2660.512 1372.015
SE of coef ———– 178.9141 230.9909 179.6761
SE of Residual 19.284 19.028 17.011 18.188
Adjusted R2 0.1771 0.1988 0.3596 0.2679
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Table 13: Regressions of Yield Spread on CDS Rate
Pool of Six Argentina Egypt Korea Mexico Russia South Africa
Constant 0.01097 0.019761 0.024375 0.002735 0.000317 -0.0068 0.014213
SE of Cons. 0.001553 0.006671 0.000876 0.000444 0.000697 0.000728 0.002742
Coef of CDS 0.841371 0.830944 0.10169 1.417557 1.111512 1.118144 0.52008
SE of coef 0.005108 0.011664 0.034368 0.049779 0.028763 0.009607 0.141073
SE of Residual 0.05731 0.10821 0.00199 0.00177 0.00223 0.00384 0.00242
Adjusted R2 0.9422 0.9164 0.07 0.767 0.8176 0.9732 0.0809
No. of obs 1667 464 104 247 334 374 144
Table 14: Regressions of CDS Rate on Yield Spread
Pool of Six Argentina Egypt Korea Mexico Russia South Africa
Constant -0.00475 0.009595 0.003925 0.000523 0.004108 0.00787 0.015306
SE of Cons 0.001815 0.007745 0.007088 0.000293 0.000521 0.000585 0.001113
Coef of spread 1.119829 1.103044 0.77734 0.541763 0.736038 0.870437 0.16796
SE of coef 0.006798 0.015483 0.262714 0.019025 0.019047 0.007479 0.045559
SE of Residual 0.06612 0.12468 0.00551 0.00109 0.00182 0.00339 0.00137
Adjusted R2 0.9422 0.9164 0.07 0.767 0.8176 0.9732 0.0809
No. obs 1667 464 104 247 334 374 144
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Table 15: Foreign Currency Sovereign Credit Rating History
Sovereign Date Long Term/ Outlook/Short Term
Argentina (Republic of) Feb. 12, 2002 SD/NM/SD
Nov. 6, 2001 SD/NM/C
Oct. 30, 2001 CC/Negative/C
Oct. 9, 2001 CCC+/Negative/C
Jul. 12, 2001 B-/Negative/C
Jun. 6, 2001 B/Negative/C
May. 8, 2001 B/CW-Neg./C
Mar. 26, 2001 B+/CW-Neg./B
Mar. 19, 2001 BB-/CW-Neg./B
Nov. 14, 2000 BB-/Stable/B
Oct. 31, 2000 BB/CW-Neg./B
Feb. 10, 2000 BB/Stable/B
July. 22, 1999 BB/Negative/B
Brazil (Federative Republic of) Jul. 2, 2002 B+/Negative/B
Aug. 9, 2001 BB-/Negative/B
Jan. 3, 2001 BB-/Stable/B
Feb. 29, 2000 B+/Positive/B
Nov. 9, 1999 B+/Stable/B
Jan. 14, 1999 B+/Negative/B
Egypt (Arab Republic of) May 22, 2002 BB+/Stable/B
Jun. 22, 2001 BBB-/Negative/A-3
Jul. 3, 2000 BBB-/Negative/A-3
Jan. 15, 1997 BBB-/Stable/A-3
Korea (Republic of) 24-Jul-02 A-/Stable/A-2
Nov. 13, 2001 BBB+/Stable/A-2
Nov. 11, 1999 BBB/Positive/A-3
Jan. 25, 1999 BBB-/Positive/A-3
Jan. 4, 1999 BB+/Positive/B
United Mexican States Feb. 7, 2002 BBB-/Stable/A-3
March 10, 2000 BB+/Positive/B
Sept. 2, 1999 BB/Positive/B
Russian Federation (The) Dec. 5, 2002 BB/Stable/B
Jul. 26, 2002 BB-/Stable/B
Feb. 22, 2002 B+/Positive/B
Dec. 19, 2001 B+/Stable/B
Oct. 4, 2001 B/Positive/B
Jun. 27, 2001 B/Stable/B
Dec. 8, 2000 B-/Stable/C
Jul. 27, 2000 SD/NM/SD
Feb. 15, 2000 SD/NM/SD
May. 7, 1999 SD/NM/SD
South Africa (Republic of) 7-May-03 BBB/Stable/A-3
Nov. 11, 1999 BBB/Positive/A-3
Jan. 25, 1999 BBB-/Positive/A-3
Jan. 4, 1999 BB+/Positive/B
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) Dec. 13, 2002 CCC+/Negative/C
Sept. 23, 2002 B-/Negative/C
Mar. 18, 2002 B/Negative/B
Feb. 11, 2002 B/CW-Neg./B
Dec. 21, 1999 B/Stable/B
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Figure 1: Investment Grade Sovereigns
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Figure 2: Speculation Grade Sovereigns
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Figure 3: Speculation Grade Sovereigns
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Figure 4: Speculation Grade Sovereigns
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